Ht, or individuals that are more aggressive when attempting to remove baits are more likely to be killed. These hypotheses will be tested through telemetry, although our results suggest that one category of individuals currently constitute most of the study population, which may impair our ability to detect a contrast in the behavior of individuals. Given the potential ecological and evolutionary importance of selective mortality due to bycatch, further work to identify individual predictors of susceptibility to bycatch is critical to deepen our understanding of this fascinating and important phenomenon. Finally, from a conservation point of view, one can envisage that in species affected by bycatch, differences in the vulnerability of individuals could improve a population’s response to this human-induced mortality [57], and our results support this hypothesis. However, our results also suggest that exposure to bycatch can substantially reduce within-population heterogeneity associated with vulnerability to being caught as bycatch, and affects generation time with potential consequences for population recovery. That could, in turn, reduce the ability of populations to respond to other or new threats.AcknowledgmentsGrateful thanks to all the field workers involved in the demographic study on Possession Island over the past 50 years and Dominique Besson for data management. We thank the “Comparative Evolutionary Demography” French working group for fruitful statistical and bibliographical help. Christophe Barbraud was partly supported during this work by a 2011 CSIRO Frohlich Fellowship. No additional external funding received for this study. Malcolm BQ-123 cost Haddon and Barry Bruce (CSIRO), Vivienne Mawson and two anonymous reviewers are thanked for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.Author ContributionsConceived and designed the experiments: CB GNT HW. Performed the experiments: CB GNT RT KD HW. Analyzed the data: CB. Wrote the paper: CB GNT RT KD HW.PLOS ONE | www.plosone.orgDifferential Susceptibility to Bycatch
Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has aimed to identify the cognitive and neural processes that support moral cognition [1,2], including emotional responding, abstract reasoning, and the processing of norms [3?]. More specifically, a number of studies support the role of emotions in moral judgment [4,7?] and in particular a dual-process model of moral judgment [10?5]. On this model, both automatic emotional processes and controlled cognitive processes drive moral judgment. For example, when people must choose whether to harm one person to save many, emotional processes typically support one type of response (e.g., don’t harm the individual), while controlled processes support a different response type (e.g., save the greatest number of lives). According to prior research [13,15], these processes are also engaged differently depending on the nature of the scenario in question. When people encounter an impersonal dilemma, which lacks salient emotional content (e.g., would you turn a order LY317615 trolley away from five people and onto one person?), most people endorse harming the one person for the greater good, thereby delivering the utilitarian response. By contrast, when people are presented with a personal dilemma (e.g., would you push a man in front of a trolley so that his body stops the trolley from hitting five people?), emotions are engaged, leading the majority of responders to reject the harmful act, thereby de.Ht, or individuals that are more aggressive when attempting to remove baits are more likely to be killed. These hypotheses will be tested through telemetry, although our results suggest that one category of individuals currently constitute most of the study population, which may impair our ability to detect a contrast in the behavior of individuals. Given the potential ecological and evolutionary importance of selective mortality due to bycatch, further work to identify individual predictors of susceptibility to bycatch is critical to deepen our understanding of this fascinating and important phenomenon. Finally, from a conservation point of view, one can envisage that in species affected by bycatch, differences in the vulnerability of individuals could improve a population’s response to this human-induced mortality [57], and our results support this hypothesis. However, our results also suggest that exposure to bycatch can substantially reduce within-population heterogeneity associated with vulnerability to being caught as bycatch, and affects generation time with potential consequences for population recovery. That could, in turn, reduce the ability of populations to respond to other or new threats.AcknowledgmentsGrateful thanks to all the field workers involved in the demographic study on Possession Island over the past 50 years and Dominique Besson for data management. We thank the “Comparative Evolutionary Demography” French working group for fruitful statistical and bibliographical help. Christophe Barbraud was partly supported during this work by a 2011 CSIRO Frohlich Fellowship. No additional external funding received for this study. Malcolm Haddon and Barry Bruce (CSIRO), Vivienne Mawson and two anonymous reviewers are thanked for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.Author ContributionsConceived and designed the experiments: CB GNT HW. Performed the experiments: CB GNT RT KD HW. Analyzed the data: CB. Wrote the paper: CB GNT RT KD HW.PLOS ONE | www.plosone.orgDifferential Susceptibility to Bycatch
Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has aimed to identify the cognitive and neural processes that support moral cognition [1,2], including emotional responding, abstract reasoning, and the processing of norms [3?]. More specifically, a number of studies support the role of emotions in moral judgment [4,7?] and in particular a dual-process model of moral judgment [10?5]. On this model, both automatic emotional processes and controlled cognitive processes drive moral judgment. For example, when people must choose whether to harm one person to save many, emotional processes typically support one type of response (e.g., don’t harm the individual), while controlled processes support a different response type (e.g., save the greatest number of lives). According to prior research [13,15], these processes are also engaged differently depending on the nature of the scenario in question. When people encounter an impersonal dilemma, which lacks salient emotional content (e.g., would you turn a trolley away from five people and onto one person?), most people endorse harming the one person for the greater good, thereby delivering the utilitarian response. By contrast, when people are presented with a personal dilemma (e.g., would you push a man in front of a trolley so that his body stops the trolley from hitting five people?), emotions are engaged, leading the majority of responders to reject the harmful act, thereby de.
